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The stark picture of human development in theArab world painted in a report written for the
United Nations by leading Arab researchers became
the subject of impassioned debate in late summer 2002.
They found that it was being seriously undermined by
failings on three fronts: civil and political freedom,
knowledge production and dissemination, and em-
powerment of women [1]. All—but especially the lat-
ter—are seen as the main factors of demographic
transition, especially fertility reduction. Women’s sta-
tus, therefore, should be reflected in continuing high
fertility. But is that the case?
The average total fertility rate (TFR) for the Arab
world was 3.4 children per woman in 2000. Still high
compared to the world average (2.7), it is low com-
pared to the six to eight children per women which
was the norm for the previous generation. So fertility
has dropped sharply. Compared to Asian or Latin
American countries at the same level of economic de-
velopment, the decline onset later in the Arab world,
but once under way progressed so fast that interna-
tional statistical yearbooks were taken unawares and
almost invariably over-estimate the true TFRs (table 1).
Arguably, then, the Arab countries would present
a paradox of fertility decline without women’s em-
powerment. And yet the causes of fertility decline are
universal: in the Arab world as elsewhere, it stems
from the changing role of women and the place of chil-
dren in the family and society, in the wake of the radi-
cal changes in today’s world, not least urbanization,
the shift to service economies and the spread of educa-
tion. Why have these causes been so late-acting in the
Arab world? Is it down to the Islamic religion and cul-
ture, or to economic and political factors?
Oil and fertility
Late-starting fertility decline in the Arab world—and
in other parts of the Muslim world—is commonly at-
tributed to the influence of Islam [4] in supposedly
holding back the two agents of demographic change—
women’s autonomy and the emergence of civil society
organizations that promote community self-empower-
ment—by harnessing the former to the yoke of male
authority and the latter to that of political authority.
And yet, whether as a State or grassroots religion,
Islam has not stood in the way of radical demographic
changes. Cases in point are the Islamic Republic of
Iran—a country which, though ruled by the most fun-
damentalist of clergies, may well have experienced
one of the most rapid fertility declines in history [5]—
or Algeria, where fertility collapsed in the 1990s at the
very time when Islamic fundamentalism was gaining
most strength among the population.
Islam, however, is not all that Arab countries have
in common; they also have a heavy economic depend-
ence on oil revenues: either directly in the case of ma-
jor oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf States
in the east, Libya and Algeria in the west), or indirect-
ly for the other countries, where oil wealth has a major
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impact through development assistance, private in-
vestment and migrant workers’ remittances. The oil
economy experienced an unprecedented boom in the
ten to twelve years after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, one
immediate consequence of which was to send oil
prices soaring. The sudden change in scale of oil re-
venues (crude oil rent) enabled Arab governments to
establish welfare state systems through financing de-
velopment (health, education, etc.) and subsidizing
consumption.
While development activities were conducive to
fertility decline, subsidized consumption, by reducing
the cost of children, could work to the opposite effect.
This is what happened in a number of Arab countries,
especially the most oil-rich ones, whose governments,
by keeping the population in check through generous
oil wealth redistribution, were able to play the forces of
conservatism and change off against one another.
Social conservatism was reflected in particular by a
continuing very low labour force participation rate
among married women. So, by both cutting the costs of
fertility and keeping women in the home, oil revenues
indirectly promoted high fertility. To some extent, oil
revenues “generated” population.
The onset of the oil crisis in the mid-1980s put an
end to this. Collapsing oil prices slashed revenues and
all countries, apart from the Gulf States, were quick to
bring in economic reforms from which families lost
out. Age at marriage rose, a trend fuelled by the prac-
tice acquired in the heady oil-rich days of amassing a
substantial marriage dowry, which now took many
years to scrape together. Married couples had smaller
families, as they continued to nurture the aspirations
held for their children during the good times, while life
grew dearer. This succession of economic cycles
widened the generation gap between the children of
the welfare state and those of structural adjustment [6].
An emerging group:
young never-married women
The early stages of fertility decline in the Arab world
were mainly due to the rising female age at first mar-
riage [3] [7]. Three quarters of girls in the 1950 birth co-
hort married under the age of twenty, compared to just
one third in the 1970 birth cohort. Mean age at mar-
riage had risen from under twenty to over twenty-five
in barely a generation.
Why should women’s age at marriage have risen
so fast? A longer length of education is one reason.
That explains the decline in early marriages, but not
the high incidence of very late marriages: the vast ma-
jority of girls are now educated up to the age of 15, but
still only a minority remain in education after age 20.
The proportion single among young women aged 20-
24 is therefore much higher than their enrolment ratio:
47% against 10% in Syria (1994 census), 84% against
17% in Tunisia (1994), 56% against 18% in Egypt (1996). 
Employment is another reason for delayed mar-
riage. It is not yet wholly acceptable in Arab societies
for a married woman to work outside the home. In the
Arab countries covered by the fertility surveys of the
1990s, the average participation rate was 31% among
single 25-29 year-old females against 18% among mar-
ried women of the same age group with (18%) or with-
out children (17%): clearly, marriage more than
motherhood is what prompts women to forsake work-
ing life. By putting a growing number of women on the
labour market, the economic changes under way—
growth in women-dominated occupations (teaching,
health, administration, etc.) and declining living condi-
tions from the end of the welfare state—have therefore
arguably contributed to delayed marriages. 
Delayed marriage tends to be construed as evi-
dence of the empowerment of Arab women. The two
reasons cited above—rising educational levels and en-
try into the labour force—argue in favour of that inter-
pretation, in that for many young women, their
unattached years are a time for acquiring skills or ma-
terial assets, and for self-fulfilment. But empowerment
is not absolute, as single women remain under the au-
thority of their father or legal guardian. They live with
their family until marriage, as do the overwhelming
majority of young people: in the working-class dis-
tricts of a large metropolis like Cairo, male students
and soldiers are the only single people to live away
from their family of origin. The lengthening pre-mari-
tal period, sometimes beyond age 25 and even to al-
most 30 (28 in urban Morocco, 29 in Libya), has created
a population sub-group of never-married young
women. This new group has not yet carved out its own
place in society, still less secured legal recognition. 
Increasingly better educated,
but less economically active than men
The number of veiled women about the streets of
many Arab cities is growing. Is this a reflection of
resurgent religious devotion? Or simply that more
women are to be seen in the public space because the
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Islamic veil allows them to move
around freely? Education is what has re-
ally allowed girls previously confined to
domesticity from the age of puberty, in-
to the public space. But has it gone as far
as full gender equality in education?
Egypt has witnessed a steady birth co-
hort-specific improvement in the deficit
of girls in the school population (figure
1). Egypt, which is averagely-placed in
this respect, reflects a reassuring picture
of a steady advance towards gender
equality. The once chiefly male school
population (barely one girl to three boys
in the cohorts born around 1930) has
now become nearly gender equal in pri-
mary and secondary education (90 girls
to 100 boys in the cohorts born around
1980), and seems well-advanced in uni-
versity education (66 girls to 100 boys in
the 1970 birth cohort). 
Unlike school, many workplaces re-
main relatively closed-off to women.
Labour statistics (table 1) show that
Arab countries have the world’s lowest
female participation rates. However, the
evidence of a series of time use surveys
is that traditional statistical sources
(censuses) underestimate Arab
women’s real contribution to the economy, because it
partly comprises homemaker activities, and census
takers’ questions are usually answered by men who
are unwilling to acknowledge the economic nature of
such activities. Is it to take account of unrecorded fe-
male activities that international publications have sig-
nificantly revalued (albeit on an unknown basis) the
female participation rates reported in recent censuses:
revalued from 14% (1996 census) to 35% in Egypt, from
15% (1998) to 30% in Algeria, from 21% (1994) to 41%
in Morocco, from 23% (1994) to 37% in Tunisia? The
fact remains that, even revalued, these rates remain
low compared to the world average (55%).
Might not women’s low participation rates hold
the clue to one means by which Islam has helped delay
fertility decline? Lawyers argue that by recognizing
women’s right to own personal property, but not an
obligation to contribute to family finances out of their
income, the Shari’ah (Islamic law) increases husbands’
reluctance to allow their wives to work. But we must
be wary of syllogism: legal provisions do not produce
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Figure 1 – Number of women per 100 men
in the educated population in Egypt
Source: 1996 census
Table 1 – Indicators of women’s status in Arab countries
Arab countries
of which 284.3 4.2 3.4 74 36 33
Egypt 67.9 3.1 3.0 65 41 35
Sudan 31.1 4.7 3.6 84 36 35
Algeria 30.3 3.0 2.7 86 24 30
Morocco 29.9 3.2 2.7 73 29 41
Iraq 22.9 5.0 – – – –
Saudi Arabia 20.3 5.9 4.2 83 39 21
Yemen 18.3 7.6 5.7 88 64 31
Syria 16.2 3.8 3.6 65 37 29
Tunisia 9.5 2.2 – 67 20 37
Libya 5.3 3.6 – 83 9 25
Jordan 4.9 4.5 3.9 55 27 27
Lebanon 3.5 2.2 1.9 44 21 30
Palestine 3.2 5.6 5.6 – – 8
Mauritania 2.7 6.0 – – – 63
UAE 2.6 3.0 – 88 33 32
Oman 2.5 5.6 – 96 56 19
Kuwait 1.9 2.8 3.3 65 29 37
Qatar 0.6 3.5 – – – 41
Bahrain 0.6 2.4 – 77 21 34
World 6 010.1 2.7 - - - 55
Sources: UN, 2002 [1]; Courbage, 2001 [2]; Rashad & Osman, 2003 [3].
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actual practices. The evidence of anthropological re-
search is that economic realities outweigh legalism: in
the crisis-hit urban classes, families not uncommonly
rely on the wife’s income, prompting husbands to for-
go standing on their legal rights to restrict the main
breadwinner’s movements. In terms of family fi-
nances, women’s work is a response to the decline in
men’s real wages.
Under the welfare state, women’s low participa-
tion rates could partly explain their high fertility. Is the
modest rise in female economic activity recorded in
times of economic hardships reason enough for the
collapse in fertility? Probably not. A more likely expla-
nation is low household incomes compounded by low
female participation. The welfare state had raised par-
ents’ aspirations and the level of their financial invest-
ment for their children, while structural adjustment
now undermines their real resources. So, women’s
partial empowerment reflected by their low contribu-
tion to household incomes becomes an effective fertili-
ty regulation factor (1). This could explain the paradox
stated above of a fertility transition unaccompanied by
(total) empowerment of women. 
The end of the patriarchal system
What prospects might these trends foreshadow?
Demographic change is undermining the patriar-
chal system which has governed the family system
since time immemorial. That system rested on two pil-
lars: younger brothers’ subordination to the eldest
brother in sib relationships, and girl-women subordi-
nation to males within the family or marriage unit.
Fertility decline undermines the first pillar. The mod-
ern trend towards two-child families—on average a
boy and a girl—quite simply lessened the scope for a
hierarchy between brothers, for lack of brothers.
The second pillar can still be based on law, still
modelled as regards personal statuses on the Shari’ah.
But the gap between law and actual practices is widen-
ing. The rise in education levels has not only affected
gender, but also generation, hierarchies. Measured by
mean length of education, the educational attainment
gap between children and their parents has grown
steadily (figure 2). From the 1950s birth cohorts, girls
have not only been educated longer than their moth-
ers, but also than their fathers. And since education is
an element of authority, girls’ over-achievement com-
1940 1950 1960 19701945 1955 1965 1975
  –3.0
–2.0
–1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
INED
018A03
Daughter or wife cohort (year of birth)
Longer or shorter mean length of education
Daughter-mother gap
Daughter-father gap
Wife-husband gap
Figure 2 – Education gap in Egypt
Note: Assumed age gaps: wife-husband 5 years, daughter-
mother 30 years, daughter-father 35 years.
Source: 1986 and 1996 censuses.
(1) Married women’s non-participation increases the relative cost of
children, while participation increases their opportunity cost (loss of
earnings during spells out of employment for child-rearing).
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pared to their fathers could well challenge the patriar-
chal system. On a cohort-for-cohort basis, women are
now almost as well-educated as men, their labour force
participation is bringing them in growing numbers in-
to close contact with non-relative males with whom
they are competing in the labour market. Women’s ac-
tivism and civil and political lobbying for the reform of
personal statuses now under way in a number of Arab
countries are likely to topple the patriarchal system
from its increasingly shaky foundations.
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